








I. In search of a concept of institutional transparency in the financial world 
 
In a public institutional context, the concept of transparency is enshrined in the broader 
notion of good governance or good administrative practice as one of its main 
components, together with other principles such as participation, reasoned decision-
making, legality and accountability
1
. There are close relationships between these 
principles, because a transparent institution will receive more inputs from interested 
stakeholders and will be naturally inclined to more reasoned decision-making. In 
parallel, in a transparent administration it will be easier to identify the persons making 
the decisions and to hold them accountable for the outcome. Nevertheless, both from an 
axiological and practical point of view, it is possible to differentiate the analysis of these 
principles. 
 
In the sphere of economic institutional cooperation, the prejudice that politicians should 
leave the leading role to economists, to technicians, has deep roots, above all in the 
financial world. The apparent impartiality of economic technocracy has illustrated the 
activity of many international economic organizations that advise their member 
countries on how they should conduct their financial or trade policies. The objectivity of 
these international bureaucracies finds recognition in the Charter of some international 





More specifically, there is a conventional wisdom, though not universally accepted, that 
holds that political control of anti-inflationary or even of general monetary policy is 
counterproductive. The irresistible temptation is usually for politicians to push for the 
adoption of populist/lax monetary measures apparently effective in the short term but 
with negative effects in the longer term. This kind of experiences have been used to 
justify that democracy is ill suited to an orthodox monetary policy and to defend that 
central bank functions should be exercised independently of the government, and 
subject only to technocratic rule. In this context, the concept of “expert democracy”
3
 
emerges to explain that citizens prefer to entrust these highly complex decisions to well 
formed and skilful bureaucrats that will not be distracted from the defence of the public 
interest, rather than to elected politicians, who are likely to waste time and resources in 
minor differences and demagogy. 
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However, in spite of this common thinking, any economic decision is a political 
decision, and there is no neutral or aseptic economic or monetary policy. The 
qualification of such decisions as ‘technical’ has not provided the most appropriate 
environment for transparency and has fostered the opaqueness of IFIs during the second 
half of the 20
th
 century. These bodies legitimized their economic and normative output 
through the fulfilment of the mandate given by their member countries and were only 
accountable to them, in an international society which consisted of states. 
 
The development of conditionality policies, now more stringent and detailed than in the 
past, led IFIs to take decisions not only on the management of capital markets, but on 
social policies, health, education, privatizations, sustainable energy or water strategies, 
and any kind of state intervention that may be affected by negotiations over budgetary 
policy
4
. This greater intrusiveness of IFIs has to be compensated by the establishment of 
elements of democratic control at an international level. Otherwise, economic 
globalization will contribute to impoverishing the quality of our democracies. The 
growing prominence of informal cooperation bodies such as the G-20 or the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) in the design of the international financial architecture in recent 
years further increases this risk, as their activities remain largely alien to democratic 
checks and balances. In this context, the demand for transparency from the international 
financial bodies appears as an indispensable condition to control respect for the other 
core principles composing the concepts of democracy and good governance. 
 
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of IFI’s transparency policies and 
denounces its shortcomings and excessive prudence, and in the case of less formal 
cooperation bodies (such as the G-20 or the FSB), the lack of attention to basic 
transparency concerns. 
 
II. Transparency in the IMF 
 
The IMF traditionally considered that discretion and confidentiality should govern its 
activities as a technical monetary organization that dealt with delicate financial data of 
member countries, and had to provide advice for the adoption of difficult measures in 
times of crisis. It was only in the 1980s that an External Relations Department was 
created and the variety of publications open to the public increased. The turning point 
came during the second half of the 1990s, when more documents started to appear on 
the IMF’s web page, and Press Information Notices (today Public Information Notices 
[PINs]) began to be published after Executive Board (EB) meetings. In January 2001 
the Board formally adopted its first decision to implement a transparency policy through 
the release of a greater number of documents and a ‘Statement of Guiding Principles for 
the IMF’s Publication Policy’
5
. An Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) was also set up 
in July 2001 with a mandate ‘to systematically conduct objective and independent 
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The decision that contains the present transparency policy of the IMF entered into force 
on March 17, 2010
7
 (Transparency Decision), and will be reviewed in 2012 in light of 
experience, and thereafter at intervals not exceeding five years. 
 
We will distinguish three different kinds of transparency in order to better understand 
the different aspects of the IMF disclosure policy, although these concepts may overlap 
and are parts of a single strategy. We can differentiate documentary transparency 
(which gives a snapshot of the documents available to the public and the conditions in 
which access is granted), decision-making transparency (which makes reference to the 
information provided as to how the decisions are being taken, and particularly who is 
taking or has taken the decision and why), and operational transparency (which enables 
the public to check how decisions have been put into practice). 
 
A. Documentary transparency 
 
In its Transparency Decision, the IMF classifies its documents as regards the regime of 




a) Country Documents. These set out the economic situation or the lending decisions 
with regard to a member state. Among others, we are referring to Article IV reports
9
, 
staff reports on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
10
 or Ex Post Monitoring and 




b) Country Policy Intentions Documents. These describe member states’ economic 
plans and commitments. Among others, we are talking of Poverty Reduction Strategy 
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, Letters of Intent
13
, Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies
14
, and 
Technical Memoranda of Understanding
15
. 
c) Fund Policy Documents. Only two kinds of documents are included in this category: 
Fund Policy Issues Papers
16
 and Public Information Notices
17
 following EB discussions. 
 
The 2010 reform reintroduced the ‘Transparency Principle’ in the text of the 
Transparency Decision
18
. This means that, as a general rule, publication of Country 
Documents and Country Policy Intentions Documents is voluntary but presumed. This 
presumption means that the publication of the documents occurs promptly after their 
consideration by the EB
19
 unless the Member concerned objects to the publication
20
. In 
parallel, a member that requests access to the Fund resources is ‘expected to indicate 





A special procedure has been established for some documents that may contain delicate 
data that could weaken the financial image of a member in times of economic 
fragility
22
. For example, the Chairman’s statement to be released after the EB has 
adopted a decision on the member’s use of Fund resources is handed in to the Executive 
Director (ED) designated by the Member to propose minor revisions and to consent to 
its publication. This procedure is closer to the need for express consent prior to 
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The IMF handles other documents related to specific countries that are not mentioned in 
the Transparency Decision although sometimes it publishes them
24
. They require a 
specific authorization for publication, and in some cases, as with the Side Letters for the 
use of Fund’s resources, they are simply placed outside any transparency obligation, as 





As can be seen, member countries can always avoid the publication of the documents 
related to them, although the rate of disclosure has significantly improved in recent 
years
26
. There is a strong expectation that the documents related to the authorization of 
the use of Fund resources will be released, although some of the commitments made by 
the borrower can be kept secret, and the modification on the conditions of lending or the 
content of the advice and support of the IMF may be kept out of the public scrutiny. 
 
The Transparency Decision also establishes that the publication of the Fund Policy 
Documents is conditioned to a positive decision of the EB to that effect. In particular, 
this organ will not allow publication when it may undermine ‘the Fund’s decision-
making process’, without any specification of what this may mean
27
. Additionally, 
Board Papers concerning IMF income, financing or budget are often published
28
, except 
when the Fund staff considers that they contain ‘market sensitive information’. Reports 
dealing with other internal or administrative matters are neither covered by the 
Transparency Decision nor usually published. 
 
When a request to obtain documents is rejected by the IMF, there is no appeal procedure 
to question the confidentiality criteria used in that specific case
29
. 
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B. Transparency in Decision-making 
 
1. A first preliminary question would be to ask what the role is of each of the different 
actors participating in the decision-making process within the IMF: management, staff, 




IMF staff directly negotiates with governments, establishing conditions, terms of 
agreement and providing advice on the economic decisions that governments have to 
make, especially when the country is asking for the Fund’s financial assistance. There is 
no way to have access to such discussions from the IMF and only if the country 
concerned so decides, may external interested stakeholders obtain this information from 
national administration sources. Staff and management also control the information 
flow between the countries that require financial help or counsel and the EB. 
 
In this context, the most important decisions are really taken before the EB meeting by 
negotiations between the staff/senior management and the most powerful member 
states. The position of many EDs does not allow them to exercise a real influence in the 
decision-making. The discussions and alternatives considered during the drafting of the 
texts that are proposed to the EB are not reflected in the final documents, leaving the 
EDs with few opportunities to introduce coherent amendments or different proposals
31
. 
The need to take speedy decisions in times of crisis works further against the capacity of 
the EDs to constructively challenge the proposals presented to them. 
 
The few member countries that are able to negotiate and influence the staff and the 
management, because of their voting powers and their human resources (their EDs are 
supported by national civil servants with deep knowledge of IMF work) may have an 
interest in this deficient flow of information within the Board because this model keeps 
its enhanced capacity of influence in the Fund’s decisions and policies
32
. Moreover, it 
makes the taking of decisions more agile. And there is an additional consequence of this 
situation: as the EB approves most of the decisions taken by management/staff, the 
responsibility of decision-making shifts from the real authors to the EDs that employ 
too much time dealing with executive and operational issues, instead of concentrating 
on a supervisory role over the management and on the design of strategic policies
33
. 
Thus, to a great extent, it is justified to qualify the IMF as an organization driven by the 
staff
34
 and a de facto directorate of the most powerful member countries
35
. 
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2. The relative weight of member countries in the decision-making process is a second 
element conditioning IMF transparency. 
 
In spite of its quasi universal membership, most countries are in fact excluded from the 
decision-making in the IMF. The number of votes in the institution determines the 
capacity of influence, and most of the voting power is concentrated in the hands of a 
few members. Previous discussions in the discreet G-7 have traditionally shaped the 
posterior policy decisions in the IMF. In particular, the capacity of the United States to 
influence the decisions in the IMF is clearly lopsided, and as a single country it enjoys a 
veto power over the most important decisions of the EB
36
. The IMF has always been 
sensitive to the position of the US Congress, not only because its headquarters is placed 
in Washington, but as a consequence of its relevance in the adoption of the most 




When voting, EDs take into account the positions and interests of the countries that 
form the constituency which they represent. This is even more so in the case of the EDs 
appointed by a single state that directly receive instructions from the country’s 
government on how to act. Within this context, any request to the EDs to act with 





The quota reforms agreed in 2008 did not satisfy the emerging countries who kept 
demanding a more comprehensive reform of the voting system
39
. However, the 
doubling of quotas and the realignment of quota shares approved by the Board of 
Governors in December 2010 involves an unprecedented shift in the voting power 
inside the IMF and can be considered as a significant step towards the 
multilateralization of decision-making in this Organization
40
. Nevertheless, the US 
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would still retain its veto capacity with 16.5% of the votes after the reform becomes 
effective, and apart from the emerging economies which have increased their voting 
power, for a great majority of the developing countries their scarce capacity of influence 
remains unchanged
41
. The fact that the Board of Governors has supported a reform of 
the Articles of Agreement so that all EDs will be elected (no EDs would be appointed 
by individual members) does not modify substantially the decision-making process as 
the major shareholders are expected to be represented by an ED that will continue to 
defend their interests as in the past
42
, above all when taking key decisions on the main 




3. Some procedural rules inhibit the transparency of the EB meetings. 
 
While the transparency presumption governs the publication of Country Documents and 
Country Policy Intentions Documents, the Fund adopts a more restrictive approach 
towards its own Policy Documents because a specific decision of the EB is required to 
allow for their public release
44
. Moreover, the fact that documents related to decision-
making can only be published after their consideration by the EB
45
 clearly contributes to 
the protection of this process from outside interference. External actors are thus 





The debate that takes place in the EB is rather opaque. Of course, these meetings are 
held behind closed doors. The ‘Gray Statements’ issued by individual EDs proposing 
changes to the Board papers under discussion are not immediately released, though they 
may introduce significant modifications in some cases
47
. These gray papers, together 
with the Board minutes and the record of votes are only available after five years. 
Therefore, accessibility to these documents is designed more for historical analysis 
rather than for transparent decision-making. The summing up of the Board meetings 
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that appears in the Public Information Notices published promptly after its reunions are 
drafted in a codified language
48
 that does not allow the individual positions of each of 
the EDs during the debate to be identified, a situation which is exacerbated by the 
practice of consensus, that is the most common way of decision-making in the EB. Here 
we find a clear need for improvement, as there is no acceptable reason why immediate 
information on the EDs votes and minority viewpoints should not be clearly and 
regularly explained in the PINs. 
 
In this context, the only way to obtain information in a timely manner (but always after 
the EB meeting) on the positions of each ED in the EB debates is through the national 
administration that he/she represents. However, the success of this initiative will depend 
on the degree of transparency of each national administration (only some few states give 
this information) and on the constituency of the ED (those EDs representing a large 
number of countries may provide vague information in order to avoid frictions among 
them). 
 
4. The role of civil society in decision-making. 
 
In spite of its bad reputation for lack of transparency, the IMF keeps regular contacts 
with civil society organizations and releases more information than many national 
governments
49
. The IMF jointly with the WB organize a Civil Society Policy Forum in 
parallel with the Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank, and the IMF 
staff hosts or attends seminars and other meetings with NGOs, the financial industry 
and other stakeholders. However, in a recent survey of the IMF IEO with Civil Society 
Organizations, most of them complained of the lack of a formal procedure for 
consultation (the IMF only consults when it wishes, and may suspend talks at any time), 
and denounced that contacts usually take place after the decisions have been taken (to 





Some authors submit that in democratic countries where there are swift mechanisms to 
channel the opinion of civil society groups towards the state position in the IMF, the 
above-mentioned lack of popular participation in decision-making can be somehow 
mitigated
51
. However, when there is no possibility to influence the position of the 
national government internally, the international institution may provide the only way to 
lobby the outcome. And NGOs perspective will normally enrich the decision-making 
process
52
, as their view of concepts such as the socialization of losses or the conditions 
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for the use of public resources in the rescue of banks will most likely differ from that of 
the financial industry (the latter disposing of more means to promote its positions). 
 
Nevertheless, there are many important obstacles for an enhanced role of NGOs in the 
IMF. The Articles of Agreement do not give them any capacity of representation, and 
indeed their legitimacy can in many occasions be questioned; moreover, some countries 
with scant weight in financial institutions have expressed fears that the little amount of 
time available for decision makers in these bodies will be consumed by western 
countries’ NGOs, thereby reducing their already insignificant capacity of influence
53
. 
On the other hand, if the NGOs cooperate with the IMF they usually become less 
militant and maybe accused of collaborationism
54
 and failure to represent civil society! 
Although there are important and respected NGOs in the international financial sphere, 
the world of civil society organizations is ample and heterogeneous, and an excessive 
participation of these entities could slow decision-making and generate important 




Taking into account all these arguments, it is difficult to foresee how NGOs could 
increase their very modest role in IMF decision-making. As happens in the national 
political process, when NGOs are not able to transfer their demands to the political 
actors (the states in the IMF), their capacity to influence will logically be modest
56
. 
While increased transparency would undoubtedly enhance their power to influence 
through persuasion and public image projection, the establishment of a wide and formal 
consultancy procedure (even if not applicable in crisis situations) still seems far away in 
the IMF. 
 
C. Operational Transparency 
 
By operational transparency we refer to the IMF disclosure policy in the application of 
its rules, and particularly, in the exercise of its surveillance role and its advisory 
functions. The surveillance of member countries’ financial policies is periodic, and 
becomes especially strong when it is developed in the course of a lending operation. 
The IMF advisory task also concerns the entire membership of the Organization, 
although it has more relevance for those member states with less means (human and 
technical) in the financial area that ask for technical assistance. Both activities may have 
a normative outcome in the form of national legislation. 
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The IMF IEO is currently studying this issue, as the Fund’s staff has mixed feelings 
about operational transparency. While it is generally recognized that transparency has 
substantially improved in recent years, there appear inevitable ‘tensions between the 
IMF’s surveillance obligations, which carry with them enhanced disclosure 
requirements, and the attractiveness of the IMF as a source of advice on sensitive issues, 
which depends on confidentiality’
57
. Confidence is seen as a key factor to strengthen the 
role of the IMF as an advisor in the designing of member countries’ economic and 
financial policies. Informal and candor dialogue between the IMF staff and the member 
countries is essential to build up the role of the IMF (and its capacity) to provide 
technical assistance. Thus, exceptions to the obligations of disclosure are seen by the 
staff as essential not to adversely affect the keenness of member countries to seek the 
IMF’s advice on delicate issues
58
. In the Fund’s view, transparency obligations should 
be linked mainly to its surveillance functions, while its advisory role would need to be 
covered by confidentiality. 
 
It has to be noticed that with regard to the information gathered or the advice given to a 
specific member country it is usually the government of such a country that desires to 
limit the outreach of the Fund’s delegation work. With the notable exception of some 
PRGF-eligible countries (and a few eastern European countries), which were more open 
to the dissemination of the Fund’s work in recent years to help them to build national 
consensus towards structural reforms, most advanced and emerging economies felt 
uneasy about policy-related outreach of IMF delegations in their country, either for the 
potential negative repercussions in the media or because of the unpopularity that any 
IMF initiative would meet due to the its past bad reputation (linked to austerity 
programs and social cuts)
59
. However, in the case of advanced economies, this is 
somehow compensated by their general acceptance of the publication of their Country 
Documents. For many non-transparent developing countries, the IMF country papers 
provide the most reliable independent source of information concerning government 
revenue and expenditure and economic statistics and future trends. 
 
On the other hand, a more extensive disclosure of policy advice would facilitate the 
accountability of IMF staff and management for the recommendations given on behalf 
of the Organization. Again, this could be a double-edged sword, because it may reduce 




D. Conclusions on IMF Transparency 
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The IMF has substantially improved the transparency of results, although it still 
preserves to a great extent the confidentiality of its decision-making process. This is 
likely to continue and any attempt to foster transparency in such a process will face 
strong opposition from the Organization’s staff and from some member countries, as 
they feel that the present degree of transparency is very high and has sometimes 
prejudiced the Fund from effectively achieving its goals
61
. The exigencies of an 
efficient and agile administration also impose constraints on the disclosure policy that 
should not be underestimated. The IMF acts as a firefighter in times of crisis and a 
complex and balanced decision-making procedure might be unworkable in such 
circumstances. The use of market-sensitive information also imposes some degree of 
confidentiality, especially in relation to financial markets, where hysterical behavior is 
so common and insider information could discriminate between economic operators. 
 
The distinction between supervisory and advisory functions, linking the more stringent 
disclosure obligations to the former, seems a reasonable way to make compatible the 
role of the IMF as a trusted advisor and its obligation to supervise member states 
economic and financial policies. However, when both functions have to be exercised at 
the same time dialectic problems will arise that cannot be easily solved in the abstract, 
and the Fund should enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. However, basic demands of 
accountability would advice the ex-post disclosure of all these activities after a short 
period of time. 
 
Interaction and consultation with NGOs is necessary and provides valuable inputs for 
the fulfillment of IMF functions, but they play (and will continue to play) a very limited 
role in the decision-making process. 
 
III. Transparency in the World Bank 
 
Like other financial institutions, the World Bank
62
 behaved with a great degree of 
opaqueness during its first 40 years of activity. Pressure from NGOs began to produce 
changes in 1985 and 1991, when the WB took its first steps towards transparency 
accepting, among other things, to publicize environmental assessments before 
approving the financing of certain projects; additional pressure from the US Congress 
led to the formal adoption of a disclosure policy in 1993. This policy has been reviewed 
and widened in 2001, 2005, and 2010 (Access to Information Decision, hereinafter 
AID)
63
. The WB was already one of the IFIs with a better rate of disclosure and, in spite 
of its shortcomings, the 2010 reform has placed the WB as the most transparent IFI. 
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As we did with the IMF, we will distinguish between documentary, decision-making 
and operational transparency. 
 
A. Documentary transparency 
 
In what the WB itself qualified as a ‘paradigm shift’, the general principle of the AID 
(section 6) is that the Bank will allow ‘access to any information in its possession that is 
not on a list of exceptions’. The WB abandoned its previous practice of issuing a 
‘positive list’ of documents (the presumption of non-disclosure applied to the rest of the 
Bank’s documents) to a general presumption of disclosure, unless the document is 
placed on the list of exceptions. Furthermore, Section 1 of the AID contains one of the 




Nevertheless, the high merit of this principle rests upon the existence of a strict negative 
list where only those documents whose disclosure could cause harm to well-defined 
interests were placed. However, the long and sometimes vague list of exceptions
65
 
provided by the WB falls short of this well-intentioned ambition. The AID does not 
include a list of documents that will ordinarily be disclosed
66
, and the mere presence of 
data that could fall under the exceptions in an otherwise disclosable document may 
justify its concealment. Besides, ‘under exceptional circumstances’ the Bank reserves its 
prerogative to restrict access to information that it would normally release ‘if it 
determines that such disclosure is likely to cause harm that outweighs the benefits’ 
(section 19, AID)
67
. The wide phrasing of this statement may frustrate reasonable 
attempts to obtain documents as it will be really difficult for a potential petitioner to 
argue against a negative decision of the management or the Board without basic 
material information. 
 
An additional limitation of the transparency presumption is found in section 14 of the 
AID where it is said that the WB will not grant access to information provided in 
confidence by member countries or third parties without their express permission. As it 
refers to ‘information’ and not to ‘documents’, the mere presence of information 
qualified as confidential by a member state may cause the non disclosure of a document 
that otherwise would have been routinely released. To strengthen this third party veto 
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capacity, this confidential information is not eligible for declassification after a lapse of 
time (sections 32 and 41, AID). A black hole is thereby constructed for external 




This external confidentiality is further complemented by the rule that governs the 
disclosure of country-specific documents. They will be released to the public only if 
they are on the list of documents prepared or commissioned by a member whose 
disclosure is a condition for doing business with the WB (section 20c, AID) or when the 
documents are prepared by the Bank and not routinely discussed with the country 
(section 20b, AID). Apart from this positive list, the curtain may be closed: for country-
specific documents routinely discussed with the member country/borrower, a 
negotiation procedure on their content is laid down and, in any case, the aide-mémoire 
of the operational missions cannot be publicly released without the county/borrower’s 
agreement
69
 (section 20a, AID); for other documents prepared by member 
countries/borrowers, disclosure is conditional on obtaining the country/borrower’s 
written consent (section 20d, AID). Thus, it has to be recognized that, despite the 
paradigm shift proclaimed in the AID, external actors still enjoy ample room for 




Board records and Board papers are routinely posted on the WB’s web page at the end 
of the deliberative process, unless they are classified as confidential (section 23, AID). 
However, there are a few exceptions of increased transparency: Board papers that 
involve consultations with stakeholders are normally released before the Board 
discussion
71
, and Board papers distributed just for information are published upon 
distribution (section 23b, AID). On the dark side, it has to be stressed that those Board 
documents more suited to demand the EDs’ accountability are kept confidential for a 




Where the 2010 AID shows the most positive and outstanding elements is in its 
procedural and institutional novelties that place the WB as the leading institution in the 
context of IFIs’ transparency guarantees: a formal procedure to request information is 
established, an Access to Information Committee (AIC) is created, and an appeal 
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procedure before an independent Appeals Board
73
 is set up to review the denials of 
information
74
. Sections 24 to 27 of the AID lay down the procedure to guarantee the 
right to access disclosed information, with short timelines for responding requests 
(normally 20 working days), and the reasons why a request would be qualified as 
‘unreasonable’ or ‘unsupported’
75
 and so refused. The internal WB procedure for the 
processing of these requests is not established in the AID
76
, but when a request is 
rejected, the notice to the requester has to specify the reasons
77
. When a document 
contains information that falls under one of the exceptions to disclosure, it has to be 
classified as such by the staff
78
, so that the time and discretion needed to respond to 
information requests is reduced to the minimum. 
 
The AIC reviews proposals to disclose information that is on the list of exceptions, and 
receives and rules on appeals under the AID because it has power to uphold or reverse 
prior decisions to deny access, with the exception of decisions made by the Bank’s 
Board
79
. It is to be expected that the AIC will unify the doctrine to avoid past 
inconsistencies of the disclosure policy
80
. In its first months of existence, that AIC has 
relevantly contributed to the disclosure of restricted information under section 18 of the 
AID
81
. However, it has rejected the eight appeals lodged against the WB’s decision to 
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deny access to information
82
. This reveals the limited scope of the appeals procedure, 
where only WB organs intervene to define public interests that could take priority over 
exceptions to disclosure
83
. No second level appeal has yet been filed before the new 
Appeals Board. 
 
A different alternative to obtain information on the WB’s decisions and activities is 
asking the country-partner in the project. National law may provide stronger legal tools 
to guarantee the right to access such information, and even establish sanctions against 
the administration for violating this right. However, as we have seen, member states 
have a great capacity to condition the disclosure policy of the WB with regard to their 
country specific documents, and it is common that those countries putting most 
obstacles to the disclosure of their business with the Bank also have the weakest 




B. Transparency in Decision-making 
 
Most of the comments made with regard to the decision-making process in the IMF 
could be extrapolated here, as the organic structure of both institutions is similar and, 
more particularly, the practice of consensus in the Board of Directors, and the weighting 
of votes assigned to each of the EDs depending on the Bank’s capital share of the 
countries that he/she represents
85
 (which is based on the quotas assigned in the IMF). 




The introduction to the AID stresses the WB’s commitment towards transparency, 
promoting the ‘engagement with stakeholders’ in ‘the design and implementation of 
projects and policies’. However, this statement is seriously questioned by the scope of 
the disclosure policy exception to protect the deliberative process. While the Bank 
acknowledges its responsibility to make publicly available its ‘decisions, results and 
agreements’, it considers it necessary to protect the confidentiality of the processes that 
lead to these decisions in order to preserve ‘the free and candid exchange of ideas’ 
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during its internal deliberative process (section 16, AID)
87
. This means the exclusion 
from disclosure of many draft reports
88
, statistics or analysis prepared to inform the 





 continue to be routinely released only after the Board 
discussion and approval (their draft version is only made public at the same time that it 
is distributed to the Board with the country’s consent)
91
. Therefore, a strong wall 
continues defending the decision-making process in the WB from external 
interference
92
, above all when the country-borrower does not wish to be exposed to 
public scrutiny, and even though the Board Calendar is published three months in 
advance. NGOs, national parliaments, and affected communities are thus prevented 
from controlling the executives’ decisions in many cases, because access to the 




It is true that relevant social and environmental information (e.g. Environmental 
Assessment Reports
94
) is released before consultations take place and that this has 
allowed in certain cases movements capable of influencing the final decision of the 
Bank
95
. However, although the WB has engaged in discussions with civil society 
stakeholders
96
 and has kept open channels of communication with interest groups 
concerned by its lending activity
97
, there is no coherent policy of previous consultation 
with those affected by its projects
98
. In this context, the capacity of civil society 
organizations (other than those directly involved in the implementation of the projects 
funded by the Bank) to influence decision-making on financial issues remains in general 
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. In other aspects of its policies, as for example the drafting of the AID, the WB 
was engaged in a dialogue with expert NGOs that could be considered as fruitful. 
 
The deliberative exception also covers the Verbatim Transcripts of Board Meetings, the 
Statements of EDs in those meetings or the Green Sheets submitted to the Board for 
discussion. As has been explained before, it is only after ten years that access is granted 
to these documents (and only in the case that they do not contain information not 
eligible for declassification), while Communications and Memoranda originating in the 
ED’s offices are made public after twenty years. These time-limits are so long that they 
may clash with national freedom of information laws
100
. From the WB’s perspective ‘if 
the view of each ED is immediately known to the public, it may put undue pressure on 
EDs, and could also politicize the Bank’s decision-making process’, above all for those 
ED’s that represent several constituencies
101
. Thus, apparently, lack of transparency and 
unaccountability (even towards the ED’s own constituencies) is the price to be paid for 
a consensual and speedy decision-making process in the WB
102
. This excessive 
precaution ought to be abandoned as the core elements of the principles of transparency 
and accountability would call for much shorter periods for the disclosure of the Board 
debates, and the positions taken by each ED. With the present system, the suspicion 
remains that major shareholders can use their influence to condition the WB’s lending 
policy for the promotion of their political interests
103
, in spite of the impartiality 




C. Operational Transparency 
                                                 
99
 However, Head considers that Multilateral Development Banks have made a reasonable effort to take 
into account the point of view of less confrontational NGOs (Head, John W., The Future of the Global 
Economic Organizations: An Evaluation of Criticisms Leveled at the IMF, the Multilateral Development 
Banks, and the WTO, (Ardsley/New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2005) 146-150). 
100
 The AID does not include a very problematic paragraph of its draft policy paper in which it was 
pointed out that papers produced or received by EDs’ offices in the conduct of their official duties should 
be viewed as Bank records and were thus covered by the confidentiality obligation of the Bank’s 
disclosure policy. The question was troublesome because the text reminded the member states that Article 
VII, section 5 of the Articles of Agreement provides that the archive of the Bank shall be inviolable, 
while Article VII, section 8 states that EDs are immune from legal process with respect to acts they 
perform in their official capacity. The inference of this reasoning was that governments receiving 
information from their EDs were under the obligation to respect the confidentiality of the documents in 
spite of their freedom of information legislation (WB, Toward Greater Transparency…, 2009 at § 45). 
The fact that the paragraph is not included in the AID does not mean that the problem cannot arise, 
involving complex national legal proceedings that may affect constitutional rights. 
101
 WB, Toward Greater Transparency…, 2009 at § 11. 
102
 Although Board Minutes are routinely posted on the WB web page promptly after the meetings, they 
just notify the decisions taken, and normally only inform of the vote of those EDs that wish to be 
recorded as opposed to or abstaining from a specific decision. Many Summaries of Discussion of the 
Board meetings are also routinely posted on the WB’s web page, but they are very brief, do not give 
notice of the ED’s individual position, and there are meetings or subjects whose Summary is not 
published (McIntosh, Toby, World Bank Releases Few Summaries of Meetings, October 15, 2010, 
available at http://www.freedominfo.org). 
103
 Dreher, Axel/Sturm, Jan-Egbert/Vreeland, James Raymond, ‘Development Aid and International 
Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?’, Journal of 
Development Economics 88 (2009) 1-18. These authors provide statistical evidence that lead them to 
conclude that temporary Security Council membership significantly increases the average of WB projects 
that a country receives. 
104
 Article IV, section 10 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement (identical to Article V, section 6 of those of 
IDA) is in theory applicable to the EDs, but it has no relevance in practice because they often receive 
instructions from the countries that they represent on the Board, above all when they are appointed by a 





Traditionally, the activity of supervision, completion and audit of the projects financed 
by the WB was rather opaque, as it could lead to frictions with borrower countries and 
question the Bank’s wisdom when deciding to fund a concrete project. Although the 
WB had already enhanced the transparency of these activities in recent years, the AID 
has brought more light to this part of its decision-making. In any case, some 
chiaroscuros remain. 
 
The numerical and statistical part of the Implementation Status and Results Reports
105
 
are now routinely published ten days after the report approval, but their second part, 
which includes the staff and management comments and ratings, is not made public (it 
is considered deliberative information). The Audited Annual Financial Statement of 
Projects
106
 (for those projects negotiated after July 2010) is now released when received 
by the WB, and the Implementation Completion Report
107
 is published after its 
distribution to the Board. However, the aide-mémoire of operational missions
108
 cannot 
be made publicly available without the county/borrower’s consent. 
 
Even if they were not involved in the design of a project, NGOs and interested 
stakeholders have a great interest in the data and operational decisions taken during its 
development. They may denounce corrupt practices or provide input to the Bank about 
the best implementation possibilities. Therefore, transparency at the operational level 
may be as relevant as in the drawing up of the project. However, we see again that when 
circumstances become uncomfortable for the borrower country it can always keep its 
dialogue/debate with the WB outside public scrutiny. In theory, this is so to facilitate 
agreements that allow for the projects’ completion. 
 
D. Conclusion on WB Transparency 
 
It has to be recognized that the WB is the IFI which has most often been involved in 
consultations with civil society organizations, and at the same time has developed the 
most transparent access to information policy. As a development institution, the WB 
receives more added value from transparency than other financial institutions because 
the design and implementation of its policies will receive input from local communities 
that will make its projects better adapted to the conditions in the field and thus more 
effective. 
 
However, as happens with the IMF, IFIs can only be as open as their member countries 
are prepared to accept, and some of them do not share the culture of transparency and 
accountability. Before the dilemma of abandoning these countries or establishing a 
minimum of disclosure acceptable to them, the WB chooses the latter and hopes that the 
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general trend towards openness
109
 will progressively soften those most obdurate. In 
these blurred circumstances, the most powerful countries continue to enjoy a margin of 
maneuver to defend their political interest in certain projects and on key policy 
decisions. 
 
IV. Transparency in the G-20 
 
G-20 takes decisions on the basis of consensus. There are no formal votes or voting 
shares on the basis of economic output, population or any other criteria. No pre-
established formal procedure governs decision-making, which results from a permanent 
process of ‘open and constructive discussion’
110
. In spite of its limited membership, this 
involves a great deal of negotiations and redrafting because we find around the table 
very different countries with diverse (and sometimes confrontational) interests and 
dissimilar backgrounds. 
 
The absence of a formal Secretariat enhances the lack of information about decision-
making processes. The country chairing the Group creates a temporary Secretariat for 
the duration of its term, coordinates the work and organizes the meetings with great 
discretion and with the only limits imposed by the other members. The G-20’s web page 
administered by the presiding country just publishes the communiqués with the 
decisions taken after the summits and a general work program. This is made on a 
voluntary basis as there is no legal obligation to perform this commitment. 
 
Aware of the criticism that this lack of transparency has attracted, the G-20 leaders have 
decided in the Cannes Summit of November 2011 to ask their Sherpas to develop 
‘working practices’ for the G-20, and to encourage their engagement with non-




Nevertheless, the high level of the discussions and their political nature do not provide 
the ideal environment for transparency. In this context, the open exchange of ideas and 
the quick adoption of decisions have been clearly prioritized over any kind of disclosure 
requirements
112
. The desire to preserve the informality of the decision-making process 
explains the widespread opposition to the creation of a permanent Secretariat among the 
members and shows the difficulties that any attempt to establish real transparency 
obligations in the functioning of the G-20 will find. Although several possibilities have 
been submitted among commentators to provide for the participation of non G-20 
countries, members of national parliaments, business, trade unions or civil society in the 
G-20 meetings
113
, the extension of the number of participants could negatively affect 
the efficacy of the Group in its decision-making and thus seems very problematic. 
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The establishment of a permanent Secretariat that could create a system of classification 
and identification of documents, and that could be used as an intermediary between civil 
society at large and the decision-makers, appears a necessary step to foster transparency 
within the G-20. The lack of accountability mechanisms and the changing and itinerant 
nature of its tiny bureaucracy do not make possible the establishment of a reliable 
disclosure policy. 
 
V. Transparency in the Financial Stability Board 
 
The FSB finds its origin in the creation in 1999 of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). 
The G-7 mandated Hans Tietmeyer, then President of the Bundesbank, to draft a report 
to make proposals in order to reduce systemic risk in the international financial system. 
The fragmentation of financial supervision and regulation throughout the world 
contributed to the instability of financial markets and the lack of efficacy of public 
regulatory policies. Although there existed several international standard setting bodies 
and various IFIs there was insufficient coordination among them, and among the 
different national authorities. This made financial crises more unpredictable and 
fostered their spill-over across frontiers. The Tietmeyer Report (February 1999) 
proposed the establishment of a new body to address these challenges. 
 
The FSF was born as a network with a little Secretariat and a limited membership. It 
brought together IFIs, central banks, transnational regulatory bodies, and national 
regulatory and supervisory authorities. The objective was to create a tool that would be 
better suited to prevent global systemic risks and imbalances by integrating the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic analysis of financial risks in a transversal 
perspective across market sectors and countries. After the financial crisis of 2007-2008 
the G-20 decided to re-found this body (renaming it FSB) and turn it into an institution 
with enlarged membership and competencies
114
. However, it continues to be a network 
and not an international organization
115
. Its Charter is a non-binding Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by its members that ‘is not intended to create any legal rights and 
obligations’ (Article 16).  
 
From a regulatory perspective, the FSB is assigned important tasks in Article 2 of its 
Charter. It advices and monitors best practice in meeting regulatory standards, reviews 
and coordinates the work of the international standard setting bodies (SSBs), and sets 
guidelines for supervisory colleges
116
. It is true that the G-20 establishes in broad terms 
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the key elements of the FSB’s agenda, and that this body is ultimately accountable to 
the G-20 for its performance, but the bulk of its work relies on the input from its 
membership. The FSB provides the place and the environment for the exchange of ideas 
and information between national authorities, SSBs and IFIs so that cross-cutting issues 
and transversal problems can be analysed more coherently from a systemic point of 
view. Thus the more general perspective of the FSB helps each of its members to better 
understand the externalities of its norms and to design regulations better adapted to the 
systemic context (and therefore more effective). In consequence, the FSB is more a 
coordinating centre than a decision-making body: it provides the diagnosis and its 
membership drafts the treatment. 
 
Formally, the Plenary is the decision-making organ of the FSB and it decides by 
consensus (Article 7 of the Charter). This organ meets at least twice a year and has 64 
members. This downplays the fact that some countries are given one, two or three seats 
depending on the size of their financial markets and their financial stability. The Plenary 
decides on the composition of the Steering Committee
117
 and may create Standing 
Committees and Working Groups. In fact, it is the Steering Committee that conducts the 
activity of the FSB. It also decides by consensus, though this is not explicitly 
established in the Charter. Neither the FSB’s Charter nor its web page offer any 
explanation on how the Steering Committee is accountable to the rest of the 
membership or on the kind of information that it has to provide to the Plenary or the rest 
of the membership
118
, in a context widespread flexibility and discretion
119
. Thus, no 
strong mechanism of accountability compensates for the lack of transparency. 
 
It may be argued that the limited membership and its homogeneous background as 
financial regulators/supervisors facilitate the flow of information better than any 
transparency and reporting requirements
120
. While this might be true from an internal 
point of view, the problem of external transparency remains unaddressed. The fact that 
the FSB performs more a coordinating role than a legislative one does not justify the 
overall absence of a disclosure policy. While it is easy to understand that quick and 
efficient decision-making procedures are necessary to confront systemic risks in times 
of crisis, and that some economic discussions or the handling of certain delicate 
financial information may require an important degree of confidentiality, the 
establishment of a clear and comprehensive transparency policy by the FSB should not 
be deferred. As the recent reforms in the IMF and the World Bank have shown, the high 
degree of technicality of its work does not pose an insurmountable obstacle. 
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In spite of the mandate of Article 3 of the FSB’s Charter to engage in wide 
consultations with stakeholders including private sector and non member authorities, 
this body has not established a comprehensive policy of public engagement with 
interested stakeholders or NGOs in the development of its activities
121
. The small size 
of its Secretariat and the ambience of ‘central bank discretion’ that pervades its work 
explain this fact. Nevertheless, the FSB has launched some public consultations on 
policy measures
122
, and it relies indirectly on that kind of interactions when it receives 
input from its membership (who also engages in consultations eventually). However, 
apart from these sporadic initiatives, only powerful interested stakeholders capable of 
successfully lobbying FSB’s members can exert some influence in the output and that of 
course out of the public scrutiny. 
 
With regard to its relation with non members, the FSB has tried to offset its limited 
membership and to increase the outreach of its work approving in July 2011 the 
establishment of six Regional Consultative Groups in which it expects to involve 70 non 
member countries. Only the future will tell whether this initiative brings more 
legitimacy and projection to the FSB’s work, but it will be a complex process that 
requests a considerable increase of the FSB’s resources. In any case, the present lack of 
transparency in the FSB’s decision-making process appears a serious hindrance to non-
member countries’ interest in becoming effectively involved in these regional groups, 
unless they are given a real chance to influence its results. 
 
VI. Final remarks 
 
This study shows that a higher degree of institutionalization calls for a more coherent 
and open transparency policy, as more structured institutions have at their disposal the 
appropriate resources and are more easily subject to pressure by the civil society. The 
IMF and the WB are clearly more transparent than informal cooperation fora such as the 
G-20 or the FSB. As a development institution, the WB gets more benefits from 
transparency and it has achieved a remarkable level of procedural guarantees that could 
be set as an example for other IFIs, including the IMF. However, in practice, even in the 
WB there is excessive latitude for opaqueness. 
 
It has to be recognized that some expert NGOs
123
 have developed an impressive effort 
in lobbying towards increased IFIs transparency. They may not have a great influence in 
policy design but their very high quality technical work has made a substantial 
contribution towards the improvement of IFIs’ transparency policies. Today, the IMF 
and the WB are more transparent than most of the international organizations. 
 
Despite its significant improvement, IFIs AI policies are very complex and that is in 
itself an important barrier to transparency. The language used is often vague, 
deliberately leaving a great discretion to the institution. If confidentiality is clearly 
justified on some occasions, general policies or loans conditionality should always be 
disclosed and subject to public scrutiny, as the design of the monetary and budgetary 
                                                 
121
 Lombardi, The Governance of the FSB 2011, at 18-19. 
122
 FSB, Effective Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions. Overview of Responses to 
the Public Consultation, 4 November 2011 (available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org). 
123





policy or the configuration of a country’s financial markets cannot be qualified as a 
mere ‘technical decision’. 
 
We should not underestimate the worries of IFIs staff about the damage that excessive 
transparency could cause to the effectiveness of their mandate. Negotiations on the 
regulation of financial markets, spending cuts, or budgetary priorities cannot succeed 
without free exchanges of ideas and a certain degree of pressure that would not be 
feasible with a constant public exposure. Thus, an excessive degree of disclosure would 
likely transfer the most sensitive negotiations to less formal and more opaque forums 
and would seriously hamper the role of IFIs as trusted advisors. Nevertheless, the 
analysis made in this chapter shows that there is scope for more openness in IFIs 
policies without harming their functions. Opaque member countries pose the main 
obstacle for a positive evolution of these policies. 
 
As regards less formal cooperation bodies, the implementation of a coherent 
transparency policy in the FSB would entail an increase in its tiny resources and some 
degree of institutionalization. The desire to make efficacy prevail over legitimacy or 
good administration explain its present institutional design. While the severe limitations 
to transparency in the G-20 may be easier to understand due to the high level of the 
discussants, the political nature of the bargaining and the very general character of the 
commitments assumed, the FSB should take its problem of opaqueness more seriously. 
Its involvement in the work of SSBs that is afterwards transformed into national 
legislation with little room for manoeuvre raises important concerns about the 
democratic control of the regulation of financial markets and the policy options behind 
the technical measures proposed to govern them. 
 
The important repercussions that IFIs decisions have over the life conditions of millions 
of people call for greater transparency. IFIs human resources are of course limited, but 
for the information not posted on the IFIs web pages there should be a request 
procedure, strict time-limits for the response
124
, denials of information should be 
accompanied by a statement of reasons, and an appeals procedure should offer the 
opportunity of independent review of the judgment of the staff most directly involved. 
Only the WB approaches this standard albeit with serious limits. 
 
Financial markets are global and therefore global and transparent IFIs should govern 
them. Opaqueness does not protect the independence and objectivity of public 
regulators from the excessive influence of the financial industry, as the latter always 
find ways to lobby in favour of its interests. Lack of transparency normally works 
against the interests of the average citizen. 
 
                                                 
124
 Unfortunately, mute refusals of information (lack of response) continue to be common in the world of 
IFIs. 
